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Security clearances are big business. In a typical year,
the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) processes 750,000
applications for new security clearances or Periodic
Reinvestigations (PR) . The DIS accomplishes this requirement
through its 343 offices across the United States and overseas.
More than 3000 special agents and industrial security
representatives investigate, inspect, advise and assist in
security administration at a cost of $ 165 million.
[Ref. l:p. 6] This equates to a lot of time,
expense and effort, and for what purpose? This is done for
the protection of United States' security. It ensures that
those individuals granted access to sensitive material will
keep these secrets safe from any who would steal them. After
all, it is not the security of the vault that keeps our
nation's secrets safe. Rather, it is the trustworthiness of
the men and women who have been granted access to our secrets
who keep those secrets secure.
The security clearance investigation process is important
and time-intensive. Often, a military unit or industrial firm
will have personnel on hand who are ready to go to work, but
cannot for lack of a security clearance. This results in
frustration for the uncleared individuals and imposes greater
work loads on those who are handling those individuals'
duties. For unit commanders or industrial managers, the wait
can also be very frustrating. They may have all the
authorized people they require, with all the right skills, yet
for lack of the right clearances, they may be "short-handed".
Greater efficiency in the processing of security clearances
would be a blessing for all concerned. Why does it take so
long to process a security clearance application?
Here's how the current investigative system works. An
individual who requires a security clearance submits a packet
of personal information through the unit or industrial firm
requesting the clearance to the Personnel Investigations
Center (PIC) . This personal information includes such items
as previous addresses, previous employers, the names and
addresses of family members and character references. Also
included are details of any arrests, medical and financial
history, and credit references. PIC does not directly verify
the credit information provided by the applicant. It employs
CBM, a subsidiary of the Equifax Corporation, as a middleman
to get credit reports from commercial credit vendors. PIC
provides the middleman with a copy of the Personnel Security
Questionnaire (PSQ) . This is the form that the applicant
filled out to request a security clearance. The addresses
that must be used in the credit search are manually
highlighted by a clerk at PIC to simplify identification by
the CBM processor. Since most applicants report several
addresses for the places they have lived and worked, this may
be a long list. To make matters worse, a clerk at CBM must
manually enter each list of complete addresses into the
computer. Thus, it is a slow process and it is easy to make
mistakes
.
The middleman takes this list of addresses and decides,
using an automated system, which of three national credit
vendors to use to get the credit reports . These credit
vendors are not equally strong throughout the nation. The
middleman has a listing that shows which vendor has the best
credit information in each sub-region of the country. So, CBM
makes the decisions and parcels out the addresses to the
vendors that will provide the best information. When all of
the reports for an applicant have been received, they are
consolidated and returned to PIC. PIC verifies the reports
and codes them, based on the quantity of derogatory
information. The case controller at PIC reviews the total
packet for each applicant and makes a decision as to which
issues need further investigation. 1 These issues are
forwarded to DIS, along with enough personal information to
conduct the field investigation. This system works, but is it
1 For financial issues, the PIC looks for any indicators of
excessive indebtedness, recurring financial difficulties, or
unexplained affluence. Financial issues are only one of sixteen
categories of adjudication criteria applied during the PIC review.
The specific adjudication criteria for financial issues is in
Appendix A.
the most efficient way? Or, is there some other way to get
the same quality of information quicker and at less cost?
Whenever a background investigation is initiated, a case
controller at PIC enters into the Defense Investigative
Management System (DIMS) computer the identifiers of the DIS
field offices initially tasked with performing investigative
actions on that case. Those actions might entail interviewing
the subject, conducting a neighborhood check, interviewing
someone listed as a reference, or performing some other
related task.
Often, the PIC case controllers use an automated scoping
guide, which is available to them through their computer
terminal. The scoping guide displays the identifier of the
DIS field office that provides coverage to any ZIP code that
is keyed into it. In addition to providing case controllers
with field office identifiers, the computer program also
enables them to verify that they correctly entered ZIP codes
by displaying the names of the cities corresponding to the ZIP
codes entered, which can then be compared to the names of the
cities listed on the applicant's PSQ.
As noted above, the field office identifiers are entered
and stored on the DIMS computer. Given that there are in
excess of 250 DIS field offices spread throughout the entire
United States, it is reasonable to assume the locations of the
DIS field offices tasked with investigating a particular
person's background will closely approximate those areas where
that person has lived, worked, attended school, or is
currently residing. Consequently, the current data entry
process offers two potential mechanisms for reducing the
credit report acquisition costs and time delays associated
with data entry. First, if case controllers were required to
enter all ZIP codes corresponding to field office taskings
into the scoping guide (even those for which they already knew
the field office identifier) , a program could be written to
capture that set of ZIP code information. Second, the field
office information currently captured by the DIMS computer
could be used to create ZIP code approximations for each
applicant. The second alternative would require no additional
information to be keyed into the system.
B . PURPOSE
The primary research question that this thesis seeks to
answer is: "Is credit data acquired on a sample of DoD
security clearance applicants of the same quality if Defense
Investigative Service Office address surrogates are used
instead of the full address information listed by the
applicant on the Personnel Security Questionnaire?" A
subsidiary question to be addressed is whether to switch from




This thesis considers two major cost reduction strategies
in its search for answers to the questions above. The first
strategy seeks to reduce the amount of information that must
be transcribed from the applicant's packet. It is believed
that in most cases it may be sufficient to just supply credit
vendors with the regions where the applicant lived, coupled
with the applicant's name, social security number (SSN) and
date of birth. All of this information is stored in the DIMS
computer. Therefore, why not provide that information
electronically to the middleman instead of sending all of that
information to CBM on paper? If there is no loss in the
quality of the information, then PIC has realized a gain in
productivity. Instead of having to send hard copies of the
applicant's PSQ to CBM after underlining all the addresses for
which a credit check is required, PIC could supply virtually
all of that information directly from the DIMS database. This
would speed up the processing time for PIC. It would
eliminate the transportation time and allow for the direct
transfer of information from PIC to CBM. It would also speed
up processing for the middleman and reduce the likelihood of
error by eliminating the keypunch operation.
The second strategy to be explored in this thesis concerns
the possible elimination of the middleman altogether. There
are three national credit vendors— TRW in Orange, California,
CBI-Equifax in Atlanta, Georgia and Trans Union in Chicago.
These national credit vendors maintain more than 400 million
records on 160 million individuals [Ref. 2]. They
receive credit data updates from the 200 local credit bureaus
affiliated with them. The national vendors add this credit
information to their centralized computers. Given that there
are only three national credit vendors, and that the credit
report acquisition system is highly automated, it may be
relatively easy to completely automate the credit acquisition
process used by DIS, reducing the need for purchasing credit
reports from a middleman. This would further speed up
processing times while realizing a cost savings. This in turn
might result in a faster turn around time on each security
clearance investigation, providing even further savings.
Therefore, if one assumes the clearance case outcome in some
instances is delayed as a result of having to wait for credit
report results, operational units may benefit from this change
because assigned personnel could go to work more quickly in
the positions for which they trained.
D. THESIS OUTLINE
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter II presents a review of the literature, highlighting
some of the significant changes in policy that have occurred
in the security clearance business . It also examines some of
the work that has been done by other scholars in the area of
credit history reporting and evaluation. Chapter III presents
a description of the sample data and the methods used to
analyze the credit history reports provided by the credit
vendors. Chapter IV details the results of the analysis,
while Chapter V discusses the results and interpretations.
Chapter VI presents conclusions of the study, recommendations,
and areas for further study
.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. ESPIONAGE—UNITED STATES UNDER ATTACK
Espionage is not a new business. It has been around for
thousands of years. The Bible contains references to the
twelve spies who were sent into the land of Canaan ahead of
the Jewish nation, to see what kind of land it was and to
determine the strength of its people and cities
[Ref . 3] . Espionage still continues to this day. It
has been particularly prevalent during the period following
World War II that has come to be known as the "Cold War." In
the early 1960's, there were ten well-publicized espionage
cases. These include the defections of Mitchell and Martin
(1960) , the Soviet collaboration of Jack Dunlap (1963) , and
the arrests of Johnson, Mintkenbaugh, and Butenko (1964) , and
Whalen (1966) . There was a period of relative calm from 1968
to 1975, but it was in reality only the eye of the hurricane.
From 1975 to 1989, there was a renewed flurry of espionage
cases that left the United States' security community reeling.
The public media and unclassified sources reported that 83
individuals were charged with espionage against the United
States in that time period [Ref. 4:p. 181].
The collective damage to national security by these spies
is much greater than the general public might suspect.
Although the Department of Defense may never be able to fully
assess the damages, it can conclude that:
• U.S. military plans and capabilities have been seriously
compromised;
• U.S. intelligence operations were gravely impaired;
• U.S. technological advantages have been overcome in some
areas;
• U.S. diplomatic secrets were exposed to the scrutiny of
our adversaries; and
• Sensitive aspects of U.S. economic life were subject to
constant Soviet monitoring. [Ref. 4:p. 5]
B. COMBATTING THE ESPIONAGE ATTACK
Congress, concerned at the severe damage that was being
done to national security by these spies, held hearings on the
matter of shoring up security procedures [Ref. 5]
[Ref. 6]. The security clearance process was singled
out for special examination because of the role that former
and present U.S. governmental, military and contractor
personnel played in the all of the recent espionage cases
[Ref. 7:p. 1] . On June 25, 1985, Secretary of
Defense Caspar W. Weinberger established the Department of
Defense Security Review Commission, more commonly referred to
as the Stilwell Commission. This occurred shortly after the
arrests on charges of espionage of Michael Walker, an active
duty Navy petty officer, and three retired Navy members—John
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and Arthur Walker, and Jerry Whitworth. Secretary Weinberger
tasked the commission to "conduct a review and evaluation of
Department of Defense security policies and procedures." He
also asked it to "identify any systemic vulnerabilities or
weaknesses in DoD security programs. . .and make recommendations
for change." [Ref. 8:p. 113] The commission
reviewed current policies and programs. It heard testimony
from senior military leaders . It also interviewed selected
industry officials whose companies held classified defense
contracts and received written statements from other corporate
officials. The commission's final report focused on ways to
ensure the DoD security system permitted only trustworthy
persons within it . One of the findings concerned improving
the quality and frequency of background investigations. The
commission made three recommendations to correct this finding:
• Expand the investigative scope for a SECRET clearance to
include a credit check of the subject and written
inquiries to past and present employers.
• Intensify the behavioral science research to improve the
background investigative process and the effectiveness of
subject interviews
.
• Reduce the backlog of reinvestigations for TOP SECRET and
Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) to manageable
levels within four years and develop a plan to conduct
periodic reinvestigations of all persons holding SECRET
clearances and above by 1995. [Ref. 8:p. 9]
The commission also recommended improving the adjudication
process for making security clearance determinations. It
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found there was a wide variance among the military services
and defense industry in making clearance determinations. Many
adjudicators had not received adequate training and had been
ruling on the basis of vague criteria. Thus, there was an
inconsistent application to a given set of investigative
findings. The commission recommended making the adjudicative
standards more precise and recommended that all adjudicators
receive standardized training.
The Defense Investigative Service took heed of these
recommendations as well as others made by the commission. All
Background Investigations conducted for Top Secret clearances
now include credit checks . These are conducted in the 50
states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico and overseas
(where APO and FPO addresses are provided) at all places where
the applicant has resided, been employed, or attended school
for 6 months or more. These credit checks focus on financial
responsibility. Credit information is also checked for
instances of unexplained affluence. At least three
supervisors or co-workers who have knowledge of the subject's
activities in the work environment are interviewed. At least
one employment reference at the current place of employment is
always interviewed (except individuals attending military
basic training, or other military training schools lasting
less than 90 days) . [Ref . 9:p. 113]
It was not just the Stilwell Commission that got DIS
concerned about the lengthy processing times required for
12
security clearances. This has always been a concern at DIS.
The director of DIS, John Donnelly, calls timeliness and
quality the cornerstones of the agency's services [Ref. l:p.
1] . However, DIS is not solely responsible for the lengthy
investigative times. DIS is constrained by several other
federal agencies and components that are involved in the
process. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department
of State, the various military investigative elements and the
Directorate for Industrial Security Clearance Review, Defense
Legal Services Agency all play a role in the responsiveness to
requests for security clearances. In FY 88 and FY 89, the
processing times for security clearances were 91 and 102 days,
respectively [Ref. l:p.9] . Budget cuts in FY 88, and the
subsequent loss of some experienced investigators contributed
to the longer processing time noted in FY 89.
The frustration felt by employees awaiting security
clearances has resulted in at least one false claim suit
against a major defense contractor. Among other charges in
the suit, the plaintiffs contend that some employees engage in
personal business and recreational activities on company time
while waiting for the security clearances that will allow them
to perform their jobs. [Ref. 10 :p. 113] The
salaries that these individuals draw are ultimately charged to
the government as a part of the defense project expense.
Across the defense industries, that can amount to millions of
dollars annually [Ref. 10:p. 113].
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DIS has recently incorporated automated information
systems to improve processing times for clearances. In
October 1988, a DIS system went into effect that allows the
forms required to initiate security clearances from industry
to be sent electronically rather than by mail. That system
alone can shave eight to ten days off the time for obtaining
a clearance. DIS has also moved all of its automated records
from a Defense Logistics Agency computer to one that is owned
by DIS. Additionally, DIS uses a portion of the DISNET, an
agency-wide communications system, to transmit investigative
leads between investigators and PIC. [Ref. l:pp. 1-2] The
Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO)
implemented the Stilwell Commission recommendation to grant
interim clearances where possible. The results speak for
themselves. More than 84% of the interim clearances requested
were granted, most within 5 days . Of the interim clearances
granted, only .06% were later withdrawn after further
investigation. The savings to industry, and ultimately the
government was more than $ 182 million. [Ref. l:p. 15]
With the help of this technology and the interim clearance
procedure, by late FY 89, DIS eliminated the backlog of TOP
SECRET Periodic Reinvestigations. However, DIS also
implemented the SECRET Periodic Reinvestigation Program for
individuals who had not been the subject of an investigation
for six years. As a result, DIS was inundated with another
20,000-30,000 case openings, [Ref. l:p. 10] creating another
14
investigative backlog. However, on the positive side, this
new policy of Periodic Reinvestigation announces clearly that
security clearances are not permanent . The Harper Committee
stated that the real "...risks commence after a clearance is
granted...." [Ref. ll:p. 87] In fact, Periodic
Reinvestigations help to reemphasize that managers, co-workers
and every cleared individual share a responsibility to be
alert for, and report, behavior or activities that would
indicate questionable loyalty or trustworthiness. It is that
kind of prompt and complete reporting that just might preclude
a future act of espionage. If this procedure had been
implemented a few years sooner, many espionage cases may have
been avoided or detected earlier. The Stilwell Commission
pointed out that in every recent case, the individual (s)
involved displayed behavior that should have caused the loss
of security access [Ref. 8:p. 44].
DIS has provided more definitive guidelines for its
adjudicators to apply when there is derogatory information on
an applicant. This, along with improved training, has brought
more consistency in the way adjudicators apply these
guidelines in determining security clearances.
C. ONE INDICATOR OF TRUSTWORTHINESS—CREDIT HISTORY
This thesis focuses on credit history and the impact it
has on the granting of a security clearance. This does not
mean that it is always the most important consideration for an
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investigator. Credit reports are one of many indicators used
in the decision making process. Experienced investigators
such as Dale Chouteau, a HUD auditor in Chicago, know that in
many cases "... [credit reports] come up clean, even when we
know there are problems." [Ref. 12] The House Select
Committee on Intelligence also noted the difficulty of
determining the possibility of espionage "...based on
lifestyle alone, even when investigations and reinvestigations
are conducted properly" [Ref. 13:p. 11], yet
"failure to consider [financial information] in security
investigations is a serious security flaw." [Ref. 7:p. 15]
Thus, credit histories are still considered one of the
indicators of trustworthiness regularly used by businesses
[Ref. 14:p. 11] and the DIS. Credit histories
describe personal financial behavior:
It tells you two things about a person: how promptly he
pays his bills and his general level of personal
expenditure. The first tells something about his
responsibility; the second, when correlated with his
stated level of income, may or may not indicate possible
conflicting interests [Ref. 15:p. 92].
Euske and Ward explored the use of available financial
data to improve the screening of individuals for positions of
trust [Ref. 16] . This is an important area of
investigation with respect to the granting of a security
clearance. In the past few years, there have been a number of
espionage cases that achieved national publicity. In each of
these, there was a common denominator that motivated these
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spies to betray their nation—money [Ref. 17]. Rosa
[Ref. 18], Allen and Polmar
[Ref. 19 :p. 282] corroborate this. The Euske
and Ward report focused on the use of credit reports, banks,
list brokerage information and airline reservations as a
series of progressively finer screens used to get an accurate
financial profile. These financial profiles are used to
identify the two types of individuals that could pose a
security risk: those with financial difficulties and those
with unexplained financial resources. Individuals who are
under financial duress may be tempted to turn to espionage to
escape their money woes . Individuals who are living beyond
their means may be receiving money from illegal activities, or
may soon find themselves in financial difficulty. In either
case, these individuals are at risk to national security.
Euske and Ward reviewed the use of the Automated Strategic
Application Processing System (ASAP), by Fair, Isaac. This
system would automate the process of interpreting credit
reports through a decision support system to arrive at a "good
risk/bad risk" decision. Euske and Ward also discussed the
way in which an expert system can simulate the investigative
expert's logic. It can analyze the patterns in the
applicant's file that are significant from the expert's
perspective. The primary emphasis in ASAP and personnel
security financial expert systems is to spend less time on
trivial and straightforward cases . This would give the
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investigators and adjudicators more time to focus on the cases
where potential threats have been identified. Euske and Ward
also commented on credit scoring models. In credit scoring,
the information provided by the applicant is assigned
numerical weights to quantify it, then those scores are
compared to a standard for a preformulated decision. The
objective of credit scoring is to increase process efficiency
and effectiveness by replacing human interactive decision
making involved in each application (i.e., the judgmental
method) with a preformulated decision process
[Ref. 20:p. 17] [Ref. 2 1]. Chhikara,
however, issues a warning concerning the use of credit-scoring
models. Most of these available now focus on default rates
for a single point in time. He advises that basing decisions
on the dynamic, multi-period nature of credit leads to better
results. [Ref. 22]
The research of Euske and Ward is focused on the right
things . Automation can improve processing times by
eliminating much of the manual, error-prone tasks. However,
savings can also be realized by reducing the quantity of
fruitless information that needs to be hand-keyed into the
system before being provided to the credit vendor. This study
examines the strategy of replacing the complete address
information that is provided to the credit vendor for each
applicant with a general delivery address corresponding to the
field offices that would provide investigative coverage for
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the applicant's address. If the quality of information
received is no less than under the current method, all of the
data inquiries could be submitted electronically from existing
data files, as opposed to having administrative personnel
reenter this data. This leads to swifter processing times for
the credit vendor, the PIC and DIS as well. Therefore,
savings in time, effort and money are achieved for all
concerned. Equally important, military units and industrial
firms might be able to receive quicker clearances for their
personnel
.
The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) and the Defense
Personnel Security Research and Education Center (PERSEREC)
look for ways to improve the credit report acquisition
process . Their investigative research has already brought to
light changes that lower the cost per individual applicant
while simultaneously increasing the amount of credit
information obtained [Ref . 23] . How is this
possible?
First, they proposed reducing the redundancy in buying
credit reports by including prior addresses along with the
current address of the applicant. Previously, CBM submitted
a separate request for credit information for each address on
the applicant's form. This is not necessary. The credit
vendor can accept multiple addresses in its credit file search
procedure at no additional charge.
19
Second, they suggested the use of an interactive
purchasing decision component. By using this component, DIS
can eliminate the indiscriminate purchase of multiple credit
reports. For example, suppose the first credit report lists
all current and prior addresses . Then it is unlikely that
significantly more information can be obtained with a second
credit report purchase. DMDC and PERSEREC offered an analysis
that documented some surprising savings. DIS could save up to
$ 5 million in the next four and a half years simply by
adopting these two suggestions.
The savings are certainly impressive. Yet there may
still be room for improvement. Can DIS send all its requests
for credit histories electronically from existing data? Can
DIS eliminate the middleman and purchase credit reports
directly from the vendors while still maintaining the same
quality of information? If the quality of information
received is no less, then DIS achieves additional savings





A. DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE
During February 1991, the CBM office in Houston, Texas
provided PERSEREC with inquiry data on all subjects they
received during a given day from the PIC for credit report
processing. This constituted a quota sample of 1103 records
of actual in-progress investigations. Some of the applicants'
names appeared as duplicates on the original tape because some
of the individuals changed their names 2 , and because of the
requirement that the PIC must request credit information
covering all places where the applicants have resided, been
employed, or attended school for 6 months or more . These
duplicate entries were eliminated to simplify comparisons.
After the duplicate entries were eliminated, there were 8 60
unique subject records remaining.
There was no attempt to focus on any particular category
of applicant (i.e., contractor personnel, civilian employees,
active duty military, or Reservists) , neither was there any
attempt made to focus on a particular region of the country.
In fact, addresses for 49 of the 50 states (Delaware was not
represented) , Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia are
Usually these were females who changed their names after
marriage or divorce.
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contained in the data sample. (See Table I.) The ages for
the applicants ranged from a low of 18 to a high of 71. The
mean age was 36.8, with a standard deviation of 12.5.
Approximately 82% of the sample was male and 18% was female 3 .
Among the types of inquiry information submitted to TRW for
the purpose of this study were various subject identifiers
such as full name, address, social security number, previous
address, and age.
B. LIMITATIONS OF A QUOTA SAMPLE
Quota samples should not be confused with random samples.
Quota samples may contain a certain number of items with a
given characteristic, as determined by the decision maker, or
they may include all the cases starting from a given point and
continuing until the desired sample size has been collected
[Ref . 24:p. 16] . Quota samples offer two
advantages over random samples. They are easy to collect and
are generally less expensive. These advantages often increase
in importance when one must rely on another organization for
the data. Along with these advantages comes a significant
limitation. Because the data is obtained from a relatively
small slice in time, there is a possibility that the data are
3 Applicant gender was not stated in the data from CBM. The
subjects' first name and their spouses' first name were examined in
an attempt to derive this variable. Some of the applicant names
were not clearly identifiable as male or female and there was no
other information in the record to make an accurate determination.
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TABLE I
DISTRIBUTION OF CLEARANCE APPLICANTS AMONG THE UNITED STATES
STATE # % STATE # %
Alaska 5 0.6 North Carolina 20 2.3
Alabama 12 1.4 North Dakota 4 0.5
Arkansas 5 0.6 Nebraska 13 1.5
Arizona 13 1.5 New Hampshire 7 0.8
California 142 16.5 New Jersey 22 2.6
Colorado 19 2.2 New Mexico 7 0.8
Connecticut 8 0.9 Nevada 4 0.5
Washington DC 11 1.3 New York 79 9.2
Florida 41 4.8 Ohio 27 3.1
Georgia 18 2.1 Oklahoma 5 0.6
Hawaii 14 1.6 Oregon 1 0.1
Iowa 4 0.5 Pennsylvania 11 1.3
Idaho 3 0.3 Puerto Rico 2 0.2
Illinois 15 1.7 Rhode Island 8 0.9
Indiana 16 1.9 South Carolina 7 0.8
Kansas 9 1.0 South Dakota 2 0.2
Kentucky 6 0.7 Tennessee 6 0.7
Louisiana 6 0.7 Texas 50 5.8
Massachusetts 13 1.5 Utah 7 0.8
Maryland 56 6.5 Virginia 80 9.3
Maine 5 0.6 Vermont 1 0.1
Michigan 4 0.5 Washington 31 3.6
Minnesota 2 0.2 Wisconsin 6 0.7
Missouri 18 2.1 West Virginia 3 0.3
Mississippi 7 0.8 Wyoming 3 0.3
Montana 2 0.2 TOTAL 860 100
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not representative of the whole population. Although there is
nothing about the data in this study that would indicate they
are not representative of the whole population, the reader
should be aware of this limitation.
C . PROCEDURE
Following the normal processing of security clearance
applications for credit information, PIC sent photocopies of
portions of the applicants' PSQs to CBM for processing. The
addresses that needed to be covered by CBM were highlighted on
those documents by the PIC case controllers. That information
was hand keyed into computer files by CBM staff in Baltimore,
Maryland. Then CBM transmitted that data electronically to
its office in Houston, Texas. At this point, there were two
changes to the normal processing procedure. First, CBM sent
a copy of the inquiry data to PERSEREC which was used to
conduct this study. Second, CBM suspended the normal
processing of the subjects until PERSEREC provided
confirmation that it had received credit data from each of the
three credit vendors using that inquiry data. Receiving the
computer tape from CBM was ideal for this study, since it
provided actual case data for analysis and allowed full
electronic manipulation to put the data into the format
required by TRW. Yet, it also imposed a responsibility.
Since these were actual in—progress investigations, the data
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had to be gathered without undue delay. Computer automation
provided the necessary speed.
When PERSEREC received the computer tape from CBM, it
transferred the data into its computer system. The data was
screened by a computer program to eliminate any duplicate
applicant records. This screening reduced the number of
applicant records from 1103 to 860 (from 1.3/subject to
1.0/subject) . This screened data was saved to a file on the
computer disk, retaining the original address information on
each applicant as it was provided by CBM. This new file was
run through two additional computer programs. The first
converted all of the specific applicant address information
into general delivery address information 4
,
changed the
applicants' original ZIP codes with that of the closest DIS
field office ZIP codes, and placed the data into the format
required by TRW for processing. This was saved as a second
file to the computer disk. The second program reformatted the
correct address information into standard TRW inquiry records.
These two new files were transferred back onto separate
computer tapes, verified for accuracy and readability, then
shipped to TRW by overnight express mail. Once TRW and the
Normally, TRW uses the string "44444 G" to indicate a
general delivery address in the appropriate field of the applicant
record. For this study, TRW requested the string "00000 M" to be
used instead.
25
other national credit vendors 5 acknowledged that they had
successfully completed processing the credit history requests,
PERSEREC notified CBM so that their processing of these
records, which had been held in suspense, could be initiated
without further delay using CBM' s current procedures for
acquiring the credit reports. The results of CBM' s credit
search were returned to both PIC and PERSEREC, but were not
analyzed as a part of this study.
TRW reported that they processed the two computer tapes
following normal procedures. The compiled credit reports were
transferred back onto computer tape, then returned to PERSEREC
by overnight express mail. This provided PERSEREC with two
separate files containing credit reports for the same set of
security clearance applicants. The final step in the study
subjected the two files of credit reports to a number of
statistical analyses and computer matching algorithms. Would
the use of the general delivery DIS regional office ZIP codes
provide the same quality of credit reporting as that provided
by the applicant's actual address?
D. METHODS OF ANALYSIS
As previously noted, TRW returned two separate computer
tapes to PERSEREC once it had completed the search for credit
Although this study only addresses the credit reports
acquired from TRW, credit histories were also obtained from Trans
Union and CBI on the same applicants. The results from those
analyses will be reported in later PERSEREC and DMDC reports.
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histories . The first tape contained all of the credit
histories that were compiled in the normal manner, using
complete address information. The second tape contained all
of the credit histories that were compiled using the
experimental method, substituting the DIS office ZIP code
surrogates in place of the applicants' full addresses. Each
tape was run with an analysis program developed by DMDC that
automatically scanned each applicant's credit report. Several
of the variables monitored whether the applicants had
derogatory information contained in their credit history since
these would be examined more closely by the PIC to see if
there was sufficient derogatory information for it to be
considered an issue case. If so, these files would be




The DMDC analysis program provided the following
information
:
• The number of bankruptcies, charge offs, account closures
and collection actions, even if the account showed a zero
balance
.
• The sum of the balances over-due in all of the delinquent
accounts
.
• The number of bankruptcies listed in the Public Record
section.
• The number of judgments listed in the Public Record
section
• The number of liens listed in the Public Record section.
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• The total score for the applicant as computed by the DMDC
credit report scoring method. (See Appendix C.)
• The number of positive, negative and non-evaluated trade
items 6 in each credit report
.
• The TRW Gold Score 7 .
Trade items are the individual accounts and elements of
credit standing that appear in each credit report . TRW divides
these into three categories. Positive trade items report that the
applicant's account is free of derogatory information. Negative
trade items indicate derogatory information in the account . Non-
evaluated trade items are those accounts that are too new to
determine whether it should be classified as positive or negative.
7 The TRW Gold Score is an indicator of future credit risk.
A high Gold Score indicates a high degree of credit risk.
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IV. FINDINGS
The original computer tape received from CBM contained
1103 records of actual in-progress investigations. After
eliminating the duplicate entries, there remained records on
8 60 unique applicants that were provided to TRW for credit
reports. TRW achieved a high success rate for finding credit
reports in the two tapes it returned to PERSEREC . The tape of
credit reports that was obtained by using complete address
information on each applicant contained credit histories on
856 of the applicants (99.53% success rate) . The tape of
credit reports that was obtained by using DIS office ZIP codes
in lieu of the complete address contained 857 credit histories
(99.65% success rate).
The derogatory information contained in the two tapes was
nearly identical for each applicant. (See Table II.) There
was one less credit report in the computer tape that was
obtained by using complete address information. Because the
missing file was one that contained a significant amount of
derogatory information, it accounts for lower values in four
of the seven cells in the Complete Address column that reflect
a number different than that shown in the DIS ZIP column. An
examination of the data revealed that CBM omitted that
subject's street name when entering the data. This error
resulted in the full address inquiry not being processed by
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the TRW system. However, the DIS ZIP code version ran without
difficulty because it was not based upon street names.
Table II reflects only absolute numbers of derogatory
items that were reported in the entire computer tape. It does
not indicate the level of agreement between the credit
reports
.
To get an accurate indication of the differences in each
pair of credit reports, the values of several dependent
variables were compared. 8 By subtracting the DMDC score for
the complete address credit report from the DMDC score for the
DIS ZIP code credit report, the resulting value provides a
measure of consistency. If the difference was zero, the two
credit reports matched exactly. If the difference was a
positive number, then the DIS ZIP credit report contained more
derogatory information than did the complete address credit
report. If the difference was negative, then the DIS ZIP
credit report had less derogatory information than did the
complete address credit report. Table III provides the
results of this analysis
.
8 In the following analyses of DMDC scores, the credit report
in the DIS ZIPS tape that had no matching report in the complete
address tape was discarded. Also, one applicant's credit report
listed an unknown amount for overdue accounts. Since an accurate
DMDC score could not be obtained for this vague information, the
credit report was not scored. It appears as the entry on the first
line of the table.
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TABLE II









BANKRUPTCIES 1 23 23
2 3 3











< $ 50 10 10
$ 50 - 99 8 8


















* Indicates that the single missing credit report affected
this cell.
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In nearly all of the cases, (98.5%), there was no
difference in the two credit reports. In eight cases, the
complete address tape contained more derogatory information,
and in five cases, the DIS ZIP tape contained more derogatory
information. The credit reports matched perfectly in
identifying applicants with bankruptcies, judgments, and
liens . The credit reports also agreed on the sum of the
balances contained in overdue accounts . There were minor
differences in two variables: defaulted accounts and charge-
offs and collection accounts with some balance due. In the
defaulted accounts reporting, there was a perfect match in 853
cases, (99.8%), and the DIS ZIP tape reported more derogatory
information in 2 cases . In the charge-off s and collection
accounts reporting, there was a perfect match in 854 cases,
TABLE III








-200 4 0.5 4 0.5
-100 2 0.2 6 0.7
-25 2 0.2 8 0.9
842 98.5 850 99.4
25 1 0.1 851 99.5
50 1 0.1 852 99.6
200 3 0.4 855 100.0
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(99.9%), whereas the complete address tape reported more
derogatory information in one case.
In a similar fashion to comparing DMDC scores obtained in
the two files, the elements that would constitute an issue
case for the PIC were also compared. The results of this
comparison resulted in 855 perfect matches between the two
tapes. Those reports that were considered issue cases in the
DIS ZIP tape also qualified as issue cases in the complete
address tape. The reverse was also true. Those credit
reports that were not issue cases in the DIS ZIP tape were
also not issue cases in the complete address tape, with one
exception. In a single credit report, the DIS ZIP tape found
more derogatory information than did the complete address tape
and that was sufficient to push the applicant beyond the issue
case threshold.
TRW included its own assessment of the credit records that
it provided to PERSEREC . Each record was scored on the
following four factors:
• Positive trade items—accounts that were in good standing.
• Non-evaluated trade items—accounts that were too new to
be evaluated accurately.
• Negative trade items—accounts that were in poor standing.
• TRW Gold Score—a proprietary system of assessing credit
risk
.
The credit reports obtained with the DIS ZIP codes and with
the complete address information were compared on each of
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these four values by subtracting the score in the complete
address information credit report from its respective score in
the DIS ZIP code credit report. The results are displayed in
Tables IV and V.
TABLE IV










-2 2 0.2 2 0.2
-1 9 1.0 11 1.3
815 94.9 826 96.2
1 23 2.7 849 98.8
2 6 0.7 855 99.5
3 3 0.3 858 99.9
6 1 0.1 859 100.0
NON-
EVALUATED
-1 2 0.2 2 0.2
853 99.3 855 99.5
1 3 0.3 858 99.9
11 1 0.1 859 100.0
NEGATIVE
-1 2 0.2 2 0.2
854 99.4 856 99.7
1 1 0.1 857 99.8
2 1 0.1 858 99.9
16 1 0.1 859 100.0
Note that TRW calculated trade item values on the full file of
860 applicants. The applicant for which the complete address
failed to find a credit report was excluded from this table.
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TABLE V








-50 99 5 0.6 5 0.7
- 1 - -49 5 0.6 10 1.4
40 5.6 50 7.0
1-49 310 43.4 360 50.6
50 - 99 346 48.5 706 99.3
100 - 149 3 0.3 709 99.7
150 - 199 2 0.2 711 100.0
The comparison of the trade items in Table IV reveal a
consistency with the previous analyses. In each of the three
categories of the trade items, the credit reports of the DIS
ZIP code format performed slightly better at uncovering
derogatory information than the complete address format. The
TRW Gold Score difference in Table V showed a wider variance
than did the DMDC scores. In ten credit reports, the complete
address format was assessed a higher Gold Score than the DIS
ZIP. In 701 credit reports, the DIS ZIP code format received
the higher Gold Score. In the remaining 148 cases, TRW did
not provide a risk assessment.
35
V. DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS
A. WHAT DOES IT MEAN?
The results of this study suggest that there is no
difference in the quality of credit reports that are obtained
from TRW with DIS office ZIP code surrogates in lieu of the
applicant's full address information. In the data collected
for this study, there was a perfect correlation for 842 of the
856 matching credit reports that were provided on the two
computer tapes. In one case, only the request from the DIS
office ZIP codes tape resulted in successfully obtaining a
credit report. The complete address tape failed to locate a
credit report . For those applicants whose files did not match
perfectly, the DIS office ZIP code tape had mixed results.
Sometimes it provided more, and other times fewer, items of
derogatory information. Even though there were instances
where it reported less, when it came to the critical point,
issue cases, the DIS ZIP tape actually found one more than did
the complete address tape.
The results of this study suggest that one step in the
clearance investigation process can be made easier and
quicker, while still maintaining the same level of
thoroughness in the credit reports that are received. Instead
of highlighting the pertinent addresses on the PSQ, the PIC
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clerk can use a computer program to match each applicant's
addresses to the appropriate DIS regional office, then submit
this information electronically to CBM for faster processing.
This provides faster processing at PIC and quicker delivery of
the information to CBM since the information travels at the
speed of light and there are no delays or expenses associated
with making photocopies of the applicable PSQ pages. CBM also
realizes several benefits from this electronic submission of
requests for credit reports. The requirement to manually type
in all of the applicant's name, SSN, age and addresses is
eliminated, along with its inherent slowness and
susceptibility to error. 9 Thus, CBM realizes greater
efficiency and responsiveness, while reducing the chances of
inserting errors into the process.
B. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
The fact that there was a high correlation between the
results obtained from the two methods in this study did not
come as a great surprise. However, the fact that the
correlation was virtually perfect did come as a surprise.
This may be an indication of the degree to which TRW has
enhanced its databases and the extent to which social security
numbers are being used when reporting credit transactions. It
The missing credit report was due to a clerical error in
typing the applicant's address manually. Examination of the
original CBM tape reveals that the street name was omitted from
that record.
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appears TRW relies heavily on a state-of-the-art computer
system and has developed sophisticated software that can both
*
manage the wealth of data collected on each individual and
retrieve it upon demand. Thus, this study began with an
expectation of positive results. However, the extent to which
this occurred was not anticipated.
A second surprise came in the high success rate of
obtaining credit reports. TRW has different types of coverage
throughout the United States. TRW defines these types as full
file coverage (the most complete) , independent credit bureau
full file coverage (serviced by TRW) and TRW Autofile
coverage. In this last category, TRW obtains its information
from key national banks, retailers and finance companies. The
geographical coverage of the input file contained applicants
from every state in the union, save one. Therefore, there was
some expectation that TRW would not have an even coverage for
all of the states in the entire sample. The age of the
applicant is an additional factor in the ability of a credit
vendor to find a credit history. In previous credit studies
conducted by DMDC, the success rates for obtaining credit
reports ran about 80% for applicants 27 years or older. At
age 22, the success rate declined to 70%. It fell to 50% for
those at age 20 and hit rock bottom with just 10% success
rates for 17 and 18 year olds. [Ref. 25] The sample
file submitted in this study contained requests for credit
reports on applicants ranging in age from 18 to 71, therefore
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there was some expectation that similarly low success rates
would be realized, especially for the younger applicants. In
actuality, the success rate was 99.65%, regardless of the age
of the applicant. This may be an indication of improvements
that have been made by TRW (and the other credit vendors as
well) to its database, its affiliated credit bureaus and to
the sophistication of its search algorithms.
The missing credit report on the complete address tape
was the third surprise. Logically, if credit information is
obtained by submitting a ZIP code for the region that has
responsibility for the full address, then the submission of
the actual address should also result in a similar (if not
identical) credit report. The fact that this did not happen
in one instance led to a close scrutiny of the record. This
record is the only instance where the original CBM tape
omitted the applicant's street name. As a result, no credit
history was found for the applicant. Normally, this would
have resulted in wasted time, effort and expense. In this
particular case, an unusual amount of derogatory information
would have been left out of the PIC case controller's decision
making process
.
The final surprise came in the apparent discrepancy
between the net differences in the DMDC score and net
differences in the TRW Gold Score. In all of the other
comparisons, there seemed to be an agreement that the DIS ZIP
code format provided a quality of credit report that was the
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equal of the complete address format, and in a few cases, the
DIS ZIP code format was even better. Consultation with TRW
revealed that the Gold Score evaluates the trade item status
in the credit report in much the same way as the DMDC scoring
method. However, it may go a step further and assesses
additional points for such things as file variations and
recent credit inquiries . The result is that Gold Scores
tended to have a wider variance in value than did the DMDC
scores on the same credit reports. As a check, the credit
reports that reflected the widest differences in Gold Scores
were compared, trade item for trade item, in the two formats.
The findings were that the status of the accounts were
identical
.
It seems to be reverse logic that in providing less
detail, i.e., the DIS office ZIP codes in lieu of the full
addresses, the result is often a more detailed credit report.
There are a number of possible explanations for this:
• The "00000 M" designator that was substituted for the
standard "44444 G" code in the DIS inquiry statements may
have provided some extra benefit in the search. 10
• There may have been minor problems with CBM' s full address
information
.
10 A phone call to TRW confirmed that the 00000 M code is less
restrictive in its search parameters . Therefore the chance of a
credit report hit is greater. This might explain the high hit rate
for the DIS ZIP tape, but it had no impact on the complete address
tape, which had an equally high hit rate.
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• There may have been minor problems with the way the data
from CBM was formatted on the full address credit inquiry
statements
.
• In a few cases, information may have been obtained on
subjects other than the actual applicant when using the
DIS office ZIP codes.
• Counter to instructions, TRW may have run the full address
inquiries first and enhanced the applicant's credit files
during that run or took some other action that affected
the outcome
.
• Name, age, SSN and general region may be all that is
needed to fully acquire credit information from TRW.
The evidence from the data seems to support the final
possibility.
C . IMPLICATIONS
The major implication in this study is that less maybe
better in this case. Providing a "00000 M" address to TRW in
lieu of the applicant's specific address appears to result in
credit reports that are just as good as those obtained with
the complete address. In a couple of cases, the "00000 M"
address provided more credit data, because that approach is
less prone to inquiry statement errors.
The current procedure to acquire credit reports requires
much more effort than may be necessary to get the information
that DIS needs to make informed decisions in the issuance of
security clearances. The applicable sections of the PSQs are
transported to CBM, then turned over to other clerks who
manually type the applicant's personal identifiers and
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highlighted portions of inquiry information into the format
used by CBM. For each credit request, the applicant's last
name, first name, middle initial, current and prior addresses,
SSN, age and several more data elements must all be entered
and verified. Consider that this is repeated approximately
300,000 times a year, a typical year's worth of security
clearance applications requiring credit checks, and one can
begin to understand the true dimensions of this requirement
.
The results of this study suggest an end to this manpower
intensive workload. Instead of photocopying and manually
highlighting the necessary fields on the PSQ that need to be
checked by CBM, the computer at PIC could automatically
electronically transmits the information that is needed to the
middleman, or perhaps even directly to the credit vendor. The
need for photocopying and transporting the PSQs to CBM can be
bypassed completely by a system that measures delivery times
in microseconds. The credit vendor's computer system compiles
a credit profile from its database, then sends this report
back through the computer network to the PIC. The PIC obtains
the credit information it needs that is every bit as good as
it gets with the present procedure but it does not have to
wait as long. The PIC case controllers more quickly identify
those applicants whose credit history suggests that they are
worthy of a security clearance or who require further
investigation. In either case, the result should be faster
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results in processing applications at DIS and at reaching
credit related decisions.
The calculation of the financial benefit of this automated
procedure falls beyond the scope of this study. However, it
does offer several direct benefits. The PIC would realize
savings in photocopying and transport expenses by forwarding
the PSQs electronically. The PIC would also require less
personnel time involved with processing these documents
.
Additional savings would be realized by the middleman or
credit vendor. By avoiding all of the manual input, there
would be immediate savings in personnel costs. The quantity
of terminals for data entry could be reduced, or perhaps
eliminated. The firm would also achieve gains in productivity
once the manual input ended. This would allow more
transactions to be processed in a given period of time, which
equates to more revenue generated in the same time frame. The
benefits to the middleman or credit vendor should result in a
lower contract price to the government for these services
.
There is also an indirect benefit from this automated
procedure. There would be a reduction in waiting time in
financial issue cases for security clearance decisions. This
would allow military units and industrial firms to put their
people to productive use sooner, with potential savings that
could run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars [Ref.
10:p. 113] [Ref. l:p. 15]. This lowers employee costs in
industry by minimizing non-productive time that employees
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without security clearances are held on the payroll.
Ultimately, the government benefits, chiefly by avoiding the




A. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This thesis began with a primary research question that
sought to answer this: "Is credit data acquired on a sample of
DoD security clearance applicants of the same quality if
Defense Investigative Service Office address surrogates are
used instead of the full address information listed by the
applicant on the Personnel Security Questionnaire?" A
secondary question it sought to address is whether or not to
switch from the current practice of keying in complete address
information. The results in this study are clear. Based on
the credit reports obtained from TRW, the use of DIS office
ZIP code surrogates provides virtually identical results as
those provided by the current procedure of using complete
applicant addresses. The evidence also indicates that at
least as far as TRW is concerned, the process of manually
keying in complete address information by the middleman is an
unnecessary delay in the security clearance investigation
procedure. It also adds a step in the sequence that can
introduce errors that can reduce the quality of credit
information obtained.
This study has taken another step toward the goal of
reducing the processing times of security clearances, using
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existing technology. It should not require additional
investment in hardware. It simply takes existing systems and
uses them in a way that brings about greater efficiency for
all parties that are involved in the process. In doing this,
there are also financial economies that can be realized. This
is true for the security clearance investigators and the
credit vendors, but it holds equally true for the industrial
firm or military unit that ultimately benefits by being able
to put its personnel to work quicker.
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This study certainly has not exhausted all of the research
potential in this area of the security clearance process nor
does it indicate that TRW is the credit vendor of choice for
the direct purchase of credit reports. In addition, the study
has not examined whether the relationships found in this study
will hold for the other two national credit vendors. Further
research is still required to examine whether similar results
will be obtained from the other two major credit vendors, CBI-
Equifax in Atlanta, and Trans Union in Chicago, as well as to
see which of the three credit vendors provides the best
quality of credit report in different regions of the country.
Ongoing research at PERSEREC and DMDC incorporated the same
list of applicants used in this study to CBI-Equifax and Trans
Union in order to make direct comparisons between the three
major credit vendors. In the present study, TRW reported no
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derogatory information on many of the applicants. In many
cases this may, in fact, indicate clean credit records.
However, in some instances it may be that TRW simply did not
have comprehensive credit information in the areas of the
country where those applicants resided. By comparing the
results obtained from the other two major credit vendors, the
true nature of those "clean" credit records can be determined.
It will also give an indication of which of the three major
credit vendors provides the best nation-wide coverage.
Another direction of study that should be pursued concerns
the true need for the services of CBM as a middleman in the
process of acquiring credit reports. Presently, the middleman
serves two primary functions—entering the applicant inquiry
data into machine readable form and forwarding the requests
for credit reports to the credit vendor who has the best
coverage in the region where the applicant resided. However,
if the quality of the credit report obtained directly from the
best credit vendor is no less than that which is being
provided through the services of the middleman, then further
gains in efficiency and financial savings could be realized by
eliminating the middleman from the process all together. The
requests for credit reports could be transmitted
electronically directly from the PIC to the credit vendor.
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C. WRAP UP
Automation provides the key which unshackles personnel
resources from the tedious, repetitive workload of years past.
It can effectively and efficiently sort through the many
routine security clearance packets that would otherwise occupy '
much of the DIS investigators' time. This gives the
investigators the ability to focus on the few issue cases that
require experienced human thought processes to make the
decision that will best protect American security. This study
has provided clear evidence that the credit data acquired on
a sample of DoD security clearance applicants from one of the
national credit vendors is of the same quality when DIS office
address surrogates are used instead of the full address
information listed by the applicant on the PSQ. In fact, in
a couple of cases, more derogatory information was brought to
light with the DIS office address surrogates than that
obtained with the applicant's complete address. The quality
was so good from this one vendor, it suggests the possibility
of eliminating the middleman from the process, which would
streamline the process and provide a positive financial impact
on the security clearance procedure. However, until further
research has been completed which addresses some of the issues
noted above, this conclusion should be considered premature.
Fortunately, it is anticipated that PERSEREC and DMDC will be






Basis: Failure to meet just and avoidable financial
obligations voluntarily incurred.
Factors Which May Be Considered In Determining Whether to Deny
or Revoke Clearance :
1. History of bad debts and unmanageable indebtedness.
2
.
Recent bankruptcy with continuing financial problems
.
3. Indebtedness aggravated or caused by gambling, alcohol,
drug abuse, or mental or emotional defects.
4 A history or pattern of writing checks not covered by
sufficient funds
.
5. Unfavorable judgments, liens, or repossessions.
6. Deceit or deception, embezzlement, or change of address
without advising creditors.
7. Applicant's indifference to financial obligations or a
stated intention not to meet these obligations in the
future
.
8. Financial mismanagement or irresponsible expenditures




1. Systematic efforts to satisfy creditors.
2
.
Favorable change in financial habits
.
3 Stable employment record and favorable references
.
4. Circumstances beyond the individual's control
contributing to indebtedness; e.g., major illness,
debilitation, decrease or cutoff of income, and
indebtedness due to court order.
5. Business-related bankruptcy.
Reproduced from [Ref. 26:encl (3)]
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APPENDIX B
TRW ACCOUNT STATUS COMMENTS [Ref . 27]
The specific account status comments that served as
"flags" for issue cases were the following:
• Debt was included in or completed through Bankruptcy
Chapter 13.
• Debt was included in or discharged through Bankruptcy
Chapter 7, 11, or 12.
• Unpaid balance was reported as a loss by the credit
grantor.
• Credit line was closed because the account holder did not
pay as agreed.
• Account was seriously past due and/or the account was
assigned to an attorney, collection agency or credit
grantor's internal collection agency.
• Account was delinquent 120 days past the due date.
• Account was delinquent 150 days past the due date.
• Account was delinquent 180 days past the due date.
• Credit grantor sold the collateral to settle defaulted
mortgage
.
• Any items of Public Record that involved Bankruptcy,
Liens, Judgments or Suits.
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APPENDIX C
DMDC CREDIT REPORT SCORING SYSTEM
Point. Values of Negative Credit. Information
Points Type of Information
1000 Bankruptcy
200 Current lien or judgment
200 Collection account, charge-off or
repossession
100 Satisfied lien or judgment
100 Paid collection account, charge-off or
repossession
100 Delinquency of 120+ days
50 Delinquency of 60 - 90 days
50 Paid delinquency of 120+ days
25 Paid delinquency of 60 - 90 days
25 Past due 30 days
10 Paid 30 days past due
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